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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE FLORIDA “THREE STRIKES RULE” FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: USING A CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE STANDARD TO TIGHTEN THE STRIKE ZONE FOR
PHYSICIAN LICENSURE REVOCATION

I. INTRODUCTION
In a speech made to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Chief Justice John
Roberts stated, “Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules; they
apply them.”1 This comparison of the judiciary to America’s favorite pastime
sparked discussion amongst commentators, one of whom remarked that the
analogy was a “rhetorically-appealing comment, no doubt, but not entirely
accurate in practice.”2 Michael McCann, a writer for the Sports Law Blog,
used the strike zone of umpire Angel Hernandez to illustrate this purported
inaccuracy of Roberts’ statement.3 McCann noted how Hernandez uses a
“uniquely-wide strike zone” and questioned whether this modified strike zone
is merely an interpretation of the standard Major League Baseball Zone, or
whether it is so distinct that it should be viewed as Hernandez “replacing the
standard rule with his own rule.”4 Although McCann’s example is most
analogous to judicial interpretation, it inadvertently touches on another parallel
between umpiring and judicial review: the importance of uniform standards.
In baseball, an umpire may be criticized for calling strikes outside of the
standard Major League Baseball strike zone because it is the standard used by
every team.5 As McCann illustrates in his Angel Hernandez example, a fan
determines that an umpire’s call is unfair when it deviates from a common
standard every umpire is expected to know and uphold. Fairness, however,
becomes more complicated when multiple standards exist for the same rule.
What if Major League Baseball created two distinct standards for the strike
zone or permitted each team to determine the strike zone used for its own

1. Charles Babington & Jo Becker, ‘Judges are Not Politicians,’ Roberts Says, WASH.
POST, Sept. 13, 2005, at A1 (quoting Chief Justice John Roberts’ statements to the Senate
Judiciary Committee in 2005).
2. Posting of Michael McCann to Sports Law Blog, http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2005/
09/evaluating-judge-john-roberts-analogy.html (Sept. 14, 2005 06:25 EST).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Major League Baseball Official Baseball Rules § 2.00, available at http://mlb.mlb.com/
mlb/downloads/y2007/02_definitions_of_terms.pdf.
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playing field? In that case, an umpire, like a judge, could only determine
whether a ball fell within a team’s designated strike zone. Umpires do not
make the standards; they simply apply them.
Unlike Major League Baseball, the “strike zone,” or evidentiary standard
used by state medical boards in physician licensure proceedings, varies from
state to state.6 When a board revokes a physician’s medical license, it is
compelled by state law to apply either a “preponderance” standard or a “clear
and convincing” evidence standard, which creates a double-edged sword of
competing policy interests.7 As a result of the administrative nature of state
medical boards, state judges give board decisions highly deferential treatment
if a physician appeals.8 Judges, like umpires, usually determine whether the
designated evidentiary standard was properly applied and will not question the
fairness of the standard unless the parties bring the issue before them.9 In
recent years, however, more and more state judges have critiqued the
constitutional soundness and policy arguments behind state medical board
evidentiary standards.10
Currently, the majority of states use a preponderance standard because
legislators and judges believe it provides the public greater protection against
incompetent physicians.11 Alternatively, advocates in the minority of states
that uphold a clear and convincing evidence standard claim that application of
a preponderance standard deprives physicians of their constitutional due
process rights. Both factions raise legitimate concerns, yet neither has

6. Roy G. Spece Jr. & John J. Marchalonis, Sound Constitutional Analysis, Moral
Principle, and Wise Policy Judgment Require a Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard of
Proof in Physician Disciplinary Proceedings, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 107, 108–09 (2006).
7. Id. at 108–09.
8. In re License Issued to Zahl, 895 A.2d 437, 445 (N.J. 2006) (“Our appellate review of an
agency’s choice of sanction is limited. Courts generally afford substantial deference to the
actions of administrative agencies such as the Board. . . . Deference is appropriate because of the
‘expertise and superior knowledge’ of agencies in their specialized fields . . . .” (citing Matturi v.
Bd. of Trs. of the Judicial Ret. Sys., 802 A.2d 496, 504 (N.J. 2002))).
9. See, e.g., N.D. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs—Investigative Panel B v. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d
216, 226 (N.D. 2007) (“It is well established that courts exercise a limited review in appeals from
decisions by administrative agencies, including the Board.”).
10. See, e.g., In re Setliff, 645 N.W.2d 601, 608 (S.D. 2002) (holding that due process
requires a clear and convincing evidence standard in state medical board proceedings). But see
Hsu, 726 N.W.2d 216 (holding that state medical boards may use a preponderance of the
evidence standard without violating constitutional due process requirements).
11. Spece & Marchalonis, supra note 6, at 108 (stating “approximately three-quarters of our
states . . . employ the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in disciplinary
proceedings”); Tara K. Widmer, South Dakota Should Follow Public Policy and Switch to the
Preponderance Standard for Medical License Revocation After In re The Medical License of Dr.
Reuben Setliff, M.D., 48 S.D. L. REV. 388, 405–06 (2003) (commenting about the public interest
concerns by states that employ a preponderance standard).
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attempted to create a uniform standard that equally protects the interests of
both patients and physicians.
Unfortunately, medical boards are not sufficiently protecting patients from
malpractice under either evidentiary standard, which exacerbates the problem.
Studies reveal that today’s national “malpractice crisis” is the result of
inadequate patient safety rather than an influx of frivolous claims and that
medical malpractice payments are not only rational, but often a sound indicator
of unqualified physicians.12 A 2007 Public Citizen report showed that
approximately six percent of doctors are responsible for almost sixty percent of
all malpractice payments, yet most of these doctors are not disciplined at all by
their respective medical boards.13 The victims of malpractice and their
families are responsible for most of the complaints brought before state
medical boards, but as few as one and a half percent of these complaints ever
reach the hearing stage before the board.14 Regarding the ratio of medical
malpractice payments to discipline, physicians are only one-third as likely “to
be convicted of professional misconduct reportable to the National Practitioner
Data Bank as they are to have to make a reportable medical malpractice
payment.”15 This proves to be a universal problem among states, regardless of
the evidentiary standard applied by the board.16 Neither regime has met the
incompetence dilemma with much success. Although a preponderance
standard would theoretically result in a greater rate of discipline, the
improvement would be negligible due to the lack of prosecution among state
medical boards.17 The crux of the problem does not stem from the minority of
12. PUB. CITIZEN’S CONG. WATCH, THE GREAT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE HOAX: NPDB
DATA CONTINUE TO SHOW MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM PRODUCES RATIONAL OUTCOMES 10–
12 (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/NPDB%20Report_Final.pdf. In 2005,
64% of malpractice payments involved death, severe or major permanent injury, paralysis, brain
damage or necessitated lifelong care. Id. at 7. In contrast, only 32% involved less severe injuries,
disproving the myth that the medical liability system compensates undeserving patients. Id.
Similarly, 82% of the total values paid out from malpractice claims went to patients who suffered
significant injuries or death. Id. at 7–8.
13. Id. at 12–13. The study describes several “repeat offenders” of medical malpractice who
were not disciplined by the state medical board at all. Id.
14. RANDALL R. BOVBJERG & PABLO ALIAGA, STATE DISCIPLINE OF PHYSICIANS:
ASSESSING STATE MEDICAL BOARDS THROUGH CASE STUDIES vi (2006), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2006/stdiscp/pdf (“Some 60–90% of complaints came from the
public in the study states, almost entirely from patients and families.”).
15. Spece & Marchalonis, supra note 6, at 109.
16. See, e.g., BOVBJERG & ALIAGA, supra note 14. The study compiled data from six
different state medical boards. Id. at 6. The states used for the study were California, Virginia
and Washington, which use a clear and convincing evidence standard, and Iowa, Massachussetts
and Ohio, which use a preponderance standard. Id.
17. Id. at 51 (“One executive director suggested that a Board’s ‘biggest challenge’ is to
measure its ‘quality of decision-making,’ for example, in triaging complaints and deciding on
prosecutions and sanctions, a sentiment echoed by another state’s executive director.”).
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cases that slip through the cracks due to less stringent evidentiary standards,
but rather from the remaining ninety-eight percent of cases that never even
make it to a formal disciplinary hearing.
In light of these concerns, one state has taken an unprecedented step
toward solving the dilemma of undisciplined repeat malpractice offenders. On
November 2, 2004, Florida passed “Amendment 8,” now known as the “Three
Strikes Rule” for medical malpractice.18 According to the amendment, any
physician found liable for three medical malpractice actions will no longer be
permitted to practice medicine in the state.19 The legislature, however,
subsequently added a caveat to the rule: the findings of repeated medical
malpractice must be based “upon clear and convincing evidence.”20 If a doctor
was found to have committed medical malpractice by a preponderance of the
evidence, the board must examine the record of the case and determine
whether the findings would have been supported by clear and convincing
evidence.21 Otherwise, the incident will not count as a “strike” against the
doctor’s license.22 By tightening the strike zone for physician discipline with a
clear and convincing evidence standard, the Three Strikes Rule provides
safeguards against undeserved license revocations while making a bold step
toward protecting the public from incompetent physicians. Although the
scheme is controversial on its face, it offers an innovative solution to the
medical malpractice dilemma that equally addresses the concerns of physicians
and patients. This three strikes regime potentially balances competing
concerns more efficiently than medical boards that currently operate under a
preponderance standard or a clear and convincing evidence standard alone.
This paper will first provide an overview of physician disciplinary
proceedings. Second, it will give a summary of the case law supporting both
the preponderance standard and the clear and convincing evidence standard.
Third, it will review the statutory scheme provided by the Florida legislature in
enacting the Three Strikes Rule and its subsequent provisions. Fourth, it will
analyze the statute’s resolution of adverse policy arguments and its potential
effects on traditional physician disciplinary schemes. Finally, it will advocate
uniform application of a three strikes regime that utilizes a clear and
convincing evidence standard.

18. Melissa Morgan Hawkins, Amendments 7 and 8 Update: Legislation Enabling the
Patients’ Right to Know Act and Three Strikes Rule, 25 TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Spring 2006, at 7.
19. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 26.
20. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.50(2) (2007).
21. Id.
22. Id. See also Hawkins, supra note 18, at 10.
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II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF STATE MEDICAL BOARD DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS
In general, the purpose of physician licensure is to protect the public from
those who are unqualified to practice medicine.23 If a physician is suspected of
misconduct, disciplinary action against the physician usually begins with the
state medical board, which attempts to ensure that health care providers
conform to “sound professional standards of conduct.”24 State medical boards
derive their powers and procedures from state statutes, and boards may
exercise only those powers that are expressly conferred or implied by statute.25
The state statutes also include the evidentiary standard the state medical board
applies when conducting disciplinary proceedings. Generally, state legislatures
delegate power to hear and determine the charges for physicians to the state
board, which also has discretion in determining the punishment for the
physician.26 Statutes usually grant boards the power to impose any of the
following disciplinary actions: fine, reprimand, censure, probation, limit,
condition, suspension or revocation.27 Although these administrative hearings
were once fairly informal, “today such adjudicative hearings more closely
resemble a non-jury trial in a civil court.”28 The process must comport with
due process, but the board is given much discretion in the investigation,
adjudication and appeals processes.29
The disciplinary process usually begins with the intake of complaints.30
Patients or family members of patients bring the majority of these complaints,
but public agencies and hospitals can also file complaints.31 Most state boards

23. Mary Feighny & Camille Nohe, A Species Unto Themselves: Professional Disciplinary
Actions, 71 J. KAN. BAR ASSN. 29, 29–30 (2002) (The purpose of a professional licensing act is
to protect the public “against unprofessional, improper, unauthorized and unqualified practice of
the healing arts. The goal is to secure to the people the services of competent, trustworthy
practitioners. The act seeks to do this through licensure. The licensing by the state, granted only
after minimal standards of proficiency are met, amounts to the state’s recognition of the licentiate
as a qualified practitioner. The continued holding of the license may be taken by the public as
official indication those standards are being maintained. The object of both granting and
revoking a license is the same—to exclude the incompetent or unscrupulous from practicing the
healing arts.” (quoting Kan. State Bd. of Healing Arts v. Foote, 436 P.2d 828, 833 (Kan. 1968))).
24. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 89 (2007).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Feighny & Nohe, supra note 23, at 37.
28. BOVBJERG & ALIAGA, supra note 14, at 27.
29. 61 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 24, § 92 (2007).
30. BOVBJERG & ALIAGA, supra note 14, at 20–21 (“Most states call all disciplinary cases
‘complaints’ even when there is no complainant.”).
31. Id. at 21 (finding that in some states, as many as 90% of the complaints are brought by
the public through patients and family members; however, a small contingent of complaints are
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require complainants to submit a formal complaint on a written or online form
or by telephone before beginning an investigation.32 Once a physician is
suspected of improper actions, the board will first conduct an investigation to
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant a disciplinary
proceeding.33 During the investigation stage, the board is not required to
disclose to the physician either the nature of the charges against him or the
identity of his accuser. Due process simply requires providing the physician
with notice of the probable cause hearing and allowing the presence of counsel
at the hearing.34 If the investigator finds sufficient evidence, most boards
appoint an attorney to serve as a “prosecutor” in the disciplinary proceeding.35
The hearing itself resembles formal adjudication in that both parties are
permitted to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses and argue the case;
however, the hearings are typically more relaxed than formal adjudications
with regard to evidentiary rules.36 Presiding officers in state medical board
proceedings are not bound by formal rules of evidence, so several forms of
evidence that are normally excluded in formal adjudications may be
considered.37
Similar to a formal adjudication, the board must support its decision to
discipline a physician with sufficient evidence. Sufficiency of the evidence
depends greatly on the evidentiary standard applied. The essential function of
this evidentiary standard is to “‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of
confidence our society thinks [the factfinder] should have in the correctness of

also brought by health personnel, board staff, hospital peer review, malpractice claims
notifications and police or drug enforcement officials).
32. Id. Ohio is one of the few states that allow complainants to submit complaints
anonymously. Most states require the complainants to submit their names in order to ease
investigation and prosecution. Id.
33. Feighny & Nohe, supra note 23, at 37.
34. Id. at 35.
35. Id. at 37.
36. Id. at 42.
37. Id. Feighny and Nohe explain the differences in evidentiary rules between board
hearings and formal trials:
[T]estimony is not necessarily excluded simply because the evidence is hearsay.
Nonparties may be allowed the opportunity to present oral or written statements provided
the parties are able to challenge or rebut any such statements, including requesting that the
statement be given under oath. Document copies may be readily available. Official
notice may be taken of the agency’s record of other proceedings, technical or scientific
matters within the agency’s specialized knowledge, certain standards adopted by state or
federal agencies or nationally recognized organizations, and any matter than can be
judicially noticed in court provided the parties are notified and afforded the opportunity to
contest the ruling.
Id.
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factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.’”38 The preponderance
standard, which is most often used in civil cases, means simply that it is more
likely than not that the physician committed the alleged malpractice or
egregious act. As in civil cases, if the evidence is perfectly balanced on both
sides, the board cannot find the physician accountable in accordance with the
preponderance standard. The clear and convincing evidence standard, in
contrast, more closely resembles the standard in criminal adjudications. This
standard is not as difficult to meet as the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard
in criminal trials. However, it clearly requires a greater amount of evidence
than the preponderance standard. Although the majority of states apply a
preponderance standard in state medical board disciplinary proceedings, nearly
one-quarter of states apply a clear and convincing evidence standard.39
If a board decides to sanction a physician, the decision is subject to judicial
review.40 Unlike most civil adjudications, “the ‘standard of judicial review of
board decisions is extremely deferential: courts will generally only overturn
board decisions that are unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.’”41
Among the limited circumstances that warrant a reversal, a state court may
reverse the decision of a board if the order violates the physician’s
constitutional rights. Usually, as long as the record contains adequate findings
of fact sufficient to support license revocation and the court sees no
constitutional concerns, the court will affirm the board’s decision.42 This

38. N.D. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs—Investigative Panel B v. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d 216, 227
(N.D. 2007) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)).
39. Spece & Marchalonis, supra note 6, at 110–11.
40. Widmer, supra note 11, at 396.
41. Id. (quoting Timothy P. McCormick, Comment, Expert Testimony and Professional
Licensing Boards: What Is Good, What Is Necessary, and the Myth of the Majority-Minority
Split, 53 ME. L. REV. 139, 144 (2001)).
42. 61 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 24, at § 102. See also Hsu, 736 N.W.2d at 226. According
to North Dakota law under N.D. CENT. CODE § 28–32–46, a board decision must be affirmed by
a court unless:
1. The order is not in accordance with the law.
2. The order is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant.
3. The provisions of this chapter have not been complied with in the proceedings before
the agency.
4. The rules or procedure of the agency have not afforded the appellant a fair hearing.
5. The findings of fact made by the agency are not supported by a preponderance of the
evidence.
6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency are not supported by findings of fact.
7. The findings of fact made by the agency do not sufficiently address the evidence
presented to the agency by the appellant.
8. The conclusions of law and order of the agency do not sufficiently explain the agency’s
rationale for not adopting any contrary recommendations by a hearing officer or an
administrative law judge.
Id. at 226.
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adequacy will naturally vary depending on the evidentiary standard applied by
the board; a lower standard will necessitate less evidence in upholding
disciplinary decisions.
III. BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS: A SCHISM AMONG STATE COURTS
When administrative proceedings depart from the standard procedural
safeguards provided in formal adjudications, constitutional due process
concerns may arise. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”43 Similarly, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that the states may not
“deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.”44
Despite the Fifth Amendment’s linguistic simplicity, due process
determinations in administrative proceedings are more complex than due
process determinations in formal court adjudications. State medical board
proceedings differ from formal adjudications in several ways, but these
differences do not necessarily create a violation of due process.45 Unlike
medical malpractice actions, which usually entail compensating the personal
harm suffered by a particular plaintiff or class, physician licensure revocation
entails protecting the interests of the public at large. As a result, due process
analysis entails a complicated balancing act between individual liberties and
the interests of the public.46
It is worthy to note that appeals from professional disciplinary actions may
be brought in federal court when the complainant alleges violation of
constitutional due process.47 It appears, however, that the majority of due
process challenges to state medical board determinations are brought in state
court; therefore, the background of this section will place emphasis on state
court jurisprudence regarding state medical board due process challenges.48

43. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
45. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 266–67 (1970).
46. See, e.g., Hsu, 726 N.W.2d at 227; Nguyen v. State, Dept. of Med. Quality Assurance
Comm’n, 29 P.3d 689, 693 (Wash. 2001) (en banc).
47. See, e.g., Romero-Barcelo v. Acevedo-Vila, 275 F. Supp. 2d 177, 189–90 (D. P. R.
2003) (involving an attorney who appealed disciplinary actions from an attorney disciplinary
proceeding, claiming that he was deprived of constitutional due process rights).
48. This author has failed to find any court cases brought in federal court by physicians
challenging state medical board determinations on the basis of constitutional due process. The
following cases involving state board determinations were brought exclusively in state court.
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The Three-Prong Test for Due Process Under Matthews v. Eldridge

Mathews v. Eldridge serves as the landmark case in challenging
administrative procedures on the basis of constitutional due process
objections.49 Under Mathews, a court must apply a three-prong test to
determine whether or not the agency action violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.50 This test has been instrumental to courts in the
context of the evidentiary standards dilemma for state medical boards.51
In Mathews, the respondent, Eldridge, collected cash benefits under the
disability insurance benefits program of the Social Security Act, which
provides workers with funds during times when they are completely disabled.52
Eldridge collected his first payment in June 1968 and then received a
questionnaire in 1972 from the state agency that monitored his medical
condition.53 On the questionnaire, Eldridge indicated that his medical
condition had not improved and provided the administration with contact
information for his treating physicians.54 The state agency, after receiving the
questionnaire and medical records from Eldridge’s physician and psychiatric
consultant, made a tentative determination that he was no longer eligible for
disability benefits after May 1972.55 The agency informed Eldridge that he
could request reasonable time in which to obtain additional information to
dispute the agency decision.56 In a letter, Eldridge responded that the agency
had enough evidence to establish that he had a disability, but the agency still
revoked his status as a disabled person in May 1972; the determination was
accepted by the Social Security Administration shortly thereafter.57 The Social
Security Administration informed Eldridge that he would have the right to state
agency reconsideration in six months.58
Following the determination, Eldridge sued in the Western District Court
of Virginia, claiming that the state agency violated his constitutional due
process right when it revoked his benefits without an oral evidentiary hearing,

49. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
50. Id. at 334–35.
51. See, e.g., Eaves v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 467 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Iowa 1991); Rucker v.
Mich. Bd. of Med., 360 N.W.2d 154, 155 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Petition of Grimm, 635 A.2d
456, 461 (N.H. 1993); In re Polk License Revocation, 449 A.2d 7, 13 (N.J. 1982); Gandhi v.
Med. Examining Bd., 483 N.W.2d 295, 298 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1992). The Mathews framework has
translated into the context of most medical licensure revocation cases, even though the framework
originated in the context of a disability benefits determination under the Social Security Act.
52. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 323–24.
55. Id. at 324.
56. Id.
57. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 324.
58. Id.
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which welfare beneficiaries are entitled to receive under the Act.59 The district
court held that under Goldberg v. Kelly and Wheeler v. Montgomery, an agency
under the Social Security Act cannot deprive a beneficiary of disability
benefits without giving the beneficiary “an effective opportunity to defend by
confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and
evidence orally.”60 Although the district court recognized that disability
beneficiaries are not as dependent on their supplemental benefits as welfare
recipients or the elderly, the court held that the disability payments did not
create an “emergency situation” that would permit a lesser due process
standard.61 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court and the Supreme
Court reversed.62
The Supreme Court in Mathews noted that “‘[D]ue process’ is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands,”
which indicates that not all administrative agencies must follow the same
procedures to comport with requirements of the Fifth Amendment.63 To
determine whether a plaintiff has been deprived of due process, the Court
examined three factors: (1) the private interests affected by the administrative
determination; (2) the risk of wrongful deprivation of those interests by the
procedures employed by the agency; and (3) the government’s interest, which
includes any fiscal or administrative burdens that the suggested procedures
would create.64 In weighing the governmental, or public, interest, the decision
involves a determination as to when the Constitution imposes adjudicative
procedures on administrative action to assure fairness.65
When the Court applied the three-prong test in Mathews, it distinguished a
disability benefits scenario from the facts present in Goldberg, where due
process required an oral evidentiary hearing.66 With regard to the private
interests affected, the Court determined that disability recipients, unlike
welfare recipients, receive compensation from a potential variety of sources, so
Eldridge’s deprivation did not rise to the level of that suffered by the affected

59. See Eldridge v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 520, 521 (W.D. Va. 1973), aff’d 493 F.2d
1230 (4th Cir. 1984), rev’d sub nom., Mathews, 424 U.S. at 325.
60. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 326 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970); Wheeler
v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 281–82 (1970)).
61. Eldridge, 361 F. Supp. at 527–28 (“It is fundamental that except in emergency situations
(and this is not one) due process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an interest such as
that here involved, it must afford ‘notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of
the case’ before the termination becomes effective.” (quoting Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542
(1971))).
62. Eldridge, 493 F.2d at 1230 rev’d, Mathews, 424 U.S. at 318.
63. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
64. Id. at 334–35.
65. Id. at 348.
66. Id. at 349.
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parties in Goldberg.67 Second, the Court determined that an oral evidentiary
hearing was less probative for disability beneficiaries, where an administrative
finding was based substantially on “routine, standard, and unbiased” medical
records, than in the context of Goldberg welfare recipients, where “issues of
witness credibility and veracity often are critical to the decisionmaking
process.”68 In balancing the final concern of the public interest, the Court
predicted that adding a mandatory evidentiary hearing to a disability benefit
proceeding would be costly and tedious and would not provide substantial
additional safeguards to the fairness of the administrative process.69
Although the Mathews decision entailed a critique of specific procedure in
the context of a Social Security Act claim, the Mathews three-prong test is
applied in most cases where a plaintiff raises a due process challenge.70 In
particular, the test anchors most opinions involving the evidentiary standards
question in physician disciplinary proceedings.71 Courts are split, however, in
striking the appropriate balance between the competing interests considered in
Mathews.
B.

Judicial Advocates of the Preponderance Standard: North Dakota State
Board of Medical Examiners—Investigative Panel B v. Hsu

As stated above, the majority of state medical boards use the
preponderance standard in their proceedings, pursuant to a statute usually
found in the state’s medical practice act.72 In several of these states, physicians
have appealed to the state court for judicial review of the standard. In January
2007, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled on such an issue and affirmed the
state board’s application of preponderance standard.73
In Hsu, the Court applied the Mathews test and found that a state medical
board’s use of the preponderance standard comports with due process.74 Dr.
Hsu was a physician licensed in North Dakota who maintained two
independent rural health clinics.75 In 2003, the state medical board brought

67. Id. at 343.
68. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343–44. The Court also determined that the second requirement is
met in disability benefit actions because the recipient is entitled to view the record prior to the
cut-off of benefits. Id. Also, the beneficiary may submit additional evidence to specifically
refute any crucial issues the decisionmakers saw in deciding to revoke the recipient’s benefits. Id.
This same rationale is not applicable in Goldberg. Id.
69. Id. at 347–48.
70. See cases accompanying supra note 51.
71. See cases accompanying supra note 51.
72. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 89 (2007).
73. N.D. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs—Investigative Panel B v. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d 216, 235
(N.D. 2007).
74. Id. at 232.
75. Id. at 219.
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charges against Dr. Hsu for rendering inappropriate care to seven of his
patients and failing to maintain proper medical records for those patients.76 An
administrative law judge recommended a finding of inappropriate care to the
state medical board and suggested revoking Dr. Hsu’s license unless he agreed
to subject himself to a system of monitoring and review imposed by the
board.77 The board decided to temporarily suspended Dr. Hsu’s license.78
Shortly thereafter, while the board was still determining whether to revoke Dr.
Hsu’s license, Investigative Panel B of the board issued a second complaint
against Hsu in 2004, which alleged improper treatment of three other patients
and inadequate documentation practices.79 After examining the evidence and
circumstances surrounding the second complaint, the administrative law judge
renewed his prior recommendation and suggested revocation unless Dr. Hsu
agreed to monitoring and evaluation by the board.80 The board adopted all but
one of the administrative law judge’s findings and conclusions and opted to
revoke Dr. Hsu’s license instead of implementing a monitoring and reviewing
scheme.81
Dr. Hsu ultimately appealed the board’s decision to the North Dakota
Supreme Court, claiming that the board’s use of a preponderance evidentiary
standard under North Dakota statute section 28-32-46(5) violated his due
process rights.82 In its review, the court applied the Mathews three-prong test

76. Id.
77. Id. Several states give state medical boards the authority to discipline a physician
without oversight by an administrative law judge, while others require an exhaustion of
administrative remedies via review by an administrative law judge prior to filing in state court.
BOVBJERG & ALIAGA, supra note 14, at 27–28.
78. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d at 219.
79. Id. In the second complaint, the administrative law judge recommended finding
improper care for Dr. Hsu’s failure to timely diagnose and treat an acute myocardial infarction,
who subsequently died as a result. The administrative law judge, however, recommended no
finding of inappropriate care for the other two patients because his treatment complied with the
“patients’ families’ wishes and essentially obtained informed consent from the patients’ families.”
Id. at 220.
80. Id. at 221. In response to Hsu’s second set of charges, the administrative law judge
noted: “Dr. Hsu is not a great physician, but neither does that evidence, even when coupled with
the evidence from this hearing, show that he is a poor physician. Rather, the evidence shows that
he is a caring physician, though perhaps a somewhat misguided physician.” Id. at 220.
81. Id. at 221.
82. Id. Hsu originally appealed to the district court, which determined that his due process
rights were not violated, but remanded the case as a result of the Board’s violation of N.D. CENT.
CODE § 28-32-39(3). Id. The court held that the Board unduly delayed its decision on the
administrative law judge’s recommendations for Hsu’s 2003 complaint, and therefore the
recommendations of the administrative law judge became the board’s final order. Id. The court
also held the Board’s rationale for departing from the administrative law judge’s recommendation
for the 2004 complaint was insufficient and not supported by the record. Id. On remand, the
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and determined that a preponderance standard does not violate the due process
requirements of the state constitution or United States Constitution.83
The court applied the first prong of the Mathews test and determined that a
physician maintains a substantial private interest in his ability to make a living
in the medical field; however, that interest does not rise to a “fundamental
right” requiring greater protection by a higher evidentiary standard.84 The
court’s rationale for the first prong depended greatly on the holding from In re
Polk, a New Jersey case involving the evidentiary standard issue.85 In Polk,
the court stated that the right to make a living is not a fundamental right.86
Though occupational licensure closely resembles a property right, the right is
“always subject to reasonable regulation in the public interest.”87
Second, the Hsu court determined that a physician’s private interest is
properly protected from wrongful deprivation under the preponderance
standard.88 First, the court followed Polk’s rationale in determining that state
medical board disciplinary proceedings involve “high substantive standards as
a basis for discipline and the licensee [can] defend adequately against the
charges through the protections of the administrative process.”89 Due to the
adversarial nature of the proceedings, the physician is protected by his ability
to present evidence and defenses.90 The Hsu court also noted that in state
medical board proceedings, the factfinders consist primarily of medical
professionals, thus minimizing the possibility of confusion and

Board clarified its decision to depart from the administrative law judge’s recommendation and
once again revoke’s Dr. Hsu’s license. Id.
83. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d at 230.
84. Id. at 230 (applying the rationale from In re Polk Licensure Revocation, 449 A.2d 7 (N.J.
1982)). In Polk, the plaintiff allergist was accused of sexually explicit behavior by several of his
young female patients. Polk, 449 A.2d at 10–11. The lower court also supported its decision to
apply a clear and convincing evidence standard by citing parallels between physician licensure
hearings and attorney licensure proceedings, stating it was “unable to perceive any justifiable
basis for the lawyer to receive the advantage of the more favorable standard of quantum of proof
in disciplinary proceedings, while denying the benefit of the same standard to the physician
similarly situated.” Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, found this “equal protection”
argument under the Constitution unpersuasive and stated that “a state is free to ‘deal with the
different professions according to the needs of the public in relation to each’ and ‘no basis for the
charge of an unconstitutional discrimination’ is established simply because a regulation affects
only one profession.” Id. at 17 (citing Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608,
610–11 (1935)).
85. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d at 229.
86. Polk, 449 A.2d at 13–14 (“[I]ndividual interests not rising to the level of fundamental
right are not entitled to protection by a standard of proof greater than a fair preponderance.”).
87. Id. at 13 (quoting Jeselsohn, Inc. v. Atlantic City, 358 A.2d 797, 799 (N.J. 1976)).
88. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d at 230.
89. Id. at 229 (citing Polk, 449 A.2d at 15–17).
90. Id. (citing Petition of Grimm, 635 A.2d 456, 461 (N.H. 1993)).
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misunderstanding about the substantive matter of the proceeding.91 The court
concluded that the nature of the proceeding, coupled with the protections of the
administrative process, sufficiently satisfied a physician’s due process rights
under a preponderance standard.92
Finally, after applying the third prong of the Mathews test, the Hsu court
determined that any interests a physician possesses in licensure are
overshadowed by the “paramount interest in protecting the general health and
welfare of the public.”93 According to the court, the special nature of the
medical profession is such that “incompetence, wrongdoing, or misconduct
could threaten life itself and protecting citizens was one of the fundamental
reasons for a government’s existence.”94 Given the serious nature of possible
wrongdoing by physicians, the court concluded the state’s interest substantially
outweighs the interests of the physician.95
Although the court recognized the substantial interest physicians have in
pursuing a living, the Hsu court ultimately decided that the good of society
outweighs any harm a physician would incur with license revocation.96 The
court determined that this societal good is best served with a preponderance
standard and that due process is sufficiently granted to physicians with a lower
standard, which follows the rationale of several other state courts that advocate
the preponderance standard.97
C. Judicial Advocates of the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard:
Nguyen v. State, Dept. of Health Med. Quality Assurance Comm’n
Just as several state judges fervently advocate a preponderance standard,
other state judges firmly advocate a clear and convincing evidence standard.98
Nguyen v. State, Department of Health Medical Quality Assurance
Commission is a recent example of how courts applying the Matthews test may
come to very different conclusions regarding the due process implications of
the preponderance standard.

91. Id. at 230. See also Grimm, 635 A.2d at 461.
92. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d at 230.
93. Id. at 229 (quoting Polk, 449 A.2d at 14).
94. Id. at 230 (citing Gandhi v. Med. Examining Bd., 483 N.W.2d, 295, 299 (Wisc. Ct. App.
1992)).
95. Id. (“We are mindful a physician’s interest in a medical license is a property interest and
is not insubstantial. In our view, however, the State’s interest in protecting the health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens is superior to a licensee’s interest.”)
96. Id.
97. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d at 229–230.
98. See, e.g., Nguyen v. State, Dept. of Med. Quality Assurance Comm’n, 29 P.3d 689, 689
(Wash. 2001) (en banc); Johnson v. Bd. of Gov. of Reg. Dentists, 913 P.2d 1339, 1342 (Okla.
1996); Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 940–41 (Wyo. 2000).
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Dr. Nguyen was a medical doctor licensed to practice in Washington
state.99 In 1989, the state medical board suspended Dr. Nguyen’s license after
determining “his practice had fallen below acceptable professional
standards.”100 The suspension was stayed on the condition that Nguyen be
monitored by another doctor. Dr. Nguyen complied with this requirement and
in 1991, the monitoring physician recommended that monitoring be reduced.101
Monitoring continued until the state board brought a new set of charges against
Dr. Nguyen in 1996.102 The new charges alleged Dr. Nguyen rendered
unprofessional care in the treatment of twenty-two patients and that Dr.
Nguyen had engaged in sexual misconduct with three of his patients.103 The
state medical board summarily suspended Dr. Nguyen’s license pending a
formal hearing on the merits of the allegations.104 After a six-day hearing in
which counsel represented Dr. Nguyen, the state medical board found by a
preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Nguyen had engaged in sexual
misconduct with three of his patients.105 As a result, the board revoked Dr.
Nguyen’s medical license and forbid him to seek re-licensure for five years.106
Dr. Nguyen appealed the decision in state court, claiming that his
constitutional due process rights had been violated when the board applied a
preponderance standard.107 The Nguyen court applied the Mathews test and
determined that due process requires state medical boards to use a clear and
convincing evidentiary standard.108
In determining the private interests of the physician, the first prong of the
Mathews test, the Nguyen court considered more than just the physician’s
interest in pursuing a living.109 In civil proceedings, the interest of the
physician is exclusively proprietary. Although the physician has an interest in
keeping his money, he does not risk losing the ability to earn money
altogether.110 By contrast, in disciplinary proceedings conducted by state

99. Nguyen, 29 P.3d at 689.
100. Id. at 689–90.
101. Id. at 690.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Nguyen, 29 P.3d at 690.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. Nguyen also claimed that use of the preponderance standard violated the Equal
Protection Clause because attorney disciplinary proceedings, in contrast, used a clear and
convincing evidentiary standard. Id. The court, determining that due process required a clear and
convincing evidentiary standard, declined to decide the equal protection issue. Id. at 697.
108. Id. at 693–97.
109. Nguyen, 29 P.3d at 694.
110. Id.
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medical boards, the court claimed that doctors have a liberty interest in the
preservation of their professional reputations as well.111 The court remarked:
“Loss or suspension of the physician’s license destroys his or her ability to
practice medicine, diminishes the doctor’s standing in both the medical and lay
communities, and deprives the doctor of the benefit of a degree for which he or
112
she has spent tens (if not hundreds) of thousands of dollars pursuing.”

Unlike civil proceedings, disciplinary proceedings are “quasi-criminal”; any
adverse consequences of a proceeding are punitive in nature.113 Applying this
rationale from Addington v. Texas, the Nguyen court held that these special
interest considerations afford a doctors a fundamental interest in their
profession.114
In applying the second prong of the Mathews test, the Nguyen court
contradicted the rationale used by preponderance courts. The Nguyen court
was also not convinced that procedural safeguards under a preponderance
standard were sufficient.115 The court believed the mechanisms of the
proceeding, such as the right to an attorney, the right to judicial review and
even the right to a hearing are all irrelevant to the issue of reducing the chance
of error.116 Regarding fairness, the court held that a risk of error is already
high because (1) the agency is permitted to act as investigator, prosecutor and
decisionmaker; (2) the subjective nature of determining standards of conduct,
which usually depend on opinion more than set rules; and (3) a lower burden
of proof increases the chances that a physician may be deprived of a license
based on an isolated instance.117
Finally, the Nguyen court examined the public interest under the Mathews
test. In contrast with cases like Hsu, the court did not believe a clear and
convincing evidence standard would cause greater harm to the public. The
Nguyen court explained that although public protection is important, “the
government’s interests are only furthered by medical disciplinary proceedings
which reach an accurate and reliable result.”118 The court determined that in
actuality, the public’s interest would be better served by a clear and convincing

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing In re Revocation of License of Kindschi, 319 P.2d 824 (1958)).
114. Nguyen, 29 P.3d at 694 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979)).
Addington requires proceedings that are “quasi-criminal” in nature to use a clear and convincing
evidence standard. The rationale in Addington has been used to describe licensure revocation
procedure for attorneys as well as physicians. See, e.g., Golden v. State Bar of Cal., 2 P.2d 325,
329 (1931).
115. Nguyen, 29 P.3d at 695.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 695–96.
118. Id. at 696–97.
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evidence standard because it would result in fewer erroneous license
revocations.119
IV. A NEW SOLUTION: THE FLORIDA “THREE STRIKES RULE”
Although many states have taken sides in the debate by choosing one
standard over the other, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to settle the
issue.120 Florida, on the other hand, has taken a different approach in an
attempt to reconcile the competing interests of the issue. In a bold and
controversial move, Floridians passed Amendment 8 (“the Amendment”) to
their state constitution in 2004, which created a Three Strikes Rule that revokes
the licenses of physicians found to have committed three instances of medical
malpractice.121
A.

The Citizens’ Initiative: Amendment 8

Preceding Florida’s 2004 election, the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers
backed a citizens’ initiative to support, among other things, two proposed
amendments to the Florida constitution.122 The Amendment, now known as
the Three Strikes Rule, stated: “No person who has been found to have
committed three or more incidents of medical malpractice shall be licensed or
continue to be licensed by the State of Florida to provide health care services
as a doctor.”123 The Amendment would affect all doctors practicing in Florida
and would take all medical malpractice judgments into account, regardless of
whether the malpractice suit had been decided in or out of state.124 Floridians
for Patient Protection (“FPP”) sponsored the Amendment and raised almost

119. Id. at 697.
120. See Wash. State Med. Quality Assurance Comm’n v. Nguyen, 29 P.3d 689, cert. denied,
535 U.S. 904 (2002).
121. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 26.
122. Mark D. Killian, Academy, FMA Square Off Over Amendments, 31 FL. BAR NEWS 13
(2004). The other proposed amendment advocated by the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers,
“Amendment 7,” promoted citizen access to peer review documents and adverse incident reports
of physicians as well as fixed rates for physician services to all patients. Id.
123. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 26. The “Three Strikes” Amendment was one of three citizen’s
initiatives on the ballot for that election. Killian, supra note 122, at 13. “Amendment 3,” backed
by the Florida Medical Association, essentially decreased the percentage of attorney’s fees for
damages awarded to successful medical malpractice litigants. Id. “Amendment 7,” the other
proposed amendment advocated by the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, would allow citizen
access to peer review documents and adverse incident reports of physicians. Id.
124. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 26. The amendment defines medical malpractice as:
both the failure to practice medicine in Florida with that level of care, skill, and treatment
recognized in general law related to health care providers’ licensure, and any similar
wrongful act, neglect, or default in other states or countries which, if committed in
Florida, would have been considered medical malpractice.
Id.
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$12 million by April 2004 in support of the initiative.125 The ballot title for the
Amendment read “Public Protection from Repeated Medical Malpractice.”126
Prior to the passage of the Amendment, the Department of Health had
discretion in the discipline of physicians for “gross or repeated malpractice.”127
The Department maintained the authority to revoke medical licenses of
physicians who consistently and repeatedly committed malpractice, but FPP
argued that the Department had been too lenient in exercising its authority.128
In a 2002 national state survey, Florida ranked forty-fourth in the number of
serious disciplinary actions taken against physicians. Florida’s low score
raised “serious questions about the extent to which patients . . . [were] being
protected from physicians who might well be barred from practice in states
with boards that [were] doing a better job of disciplining physicians.”129
Ironically, a Public Citizen survey revealed “6 percent of the doctors in Florida
[were] responsible for half the malpractice.”130 The initiative was targeted at
these incompetent physicians who were allegedly responsible for high
industry-wide premiums.131
The Amendment was met with both fear and criticism from the medical
profession.132 Several doctors thought the Three Strikes Rule, which happened
to be heavily supported by attorneys, was aimed at forcing doctors to settle
cases.133 The medical community feared a mass exodus of physicians from
Florida, particularly in the high-risk areas of obstetrics, neurosurgery,
orthopedic surgery and trauma care.134 The Florida Dental Association
believed the Amendment raised due process concerns because the rule would
lower the evidentiary standard in malpractice suits from clear and convincing
evidence to a mere preponderance standard.135 Doctors also expressed concern

125. OFFICE OF ECON. & DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH, THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE,
INITIATIVE FINANCIAL INFORMATION STATEMENT: PUBLIC PROTECTION FROM REPEATED
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (2004), available at http://edr.state.fl.us/conferences/constitutional
impact/2004%20Ballot/a4fis_complete.pdf.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. PUBLIC CITIZEN, RANKING OF STATE MEDICAL BOARD SERIOUS DISCIPLINARY
ACTIONS IN 2002 (2002), available at http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7234.
130. Siobhan Morrissey, Doctors Fear Three-Strikes Law: Florida Amendment Could Make
Med-Mal Settlements a Law Practice Niche, 45 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 3 (2004).
131. Steve Ellman, Capped, Exposed and Ejected: Plaintiff Lawyers and Doctors Warn of
Dire Consequences in Battle Over Nov. 2 Ballot Initiatives to Limit Attorney Fees, Open Medical
Error Records, and Revoke Repeat Offenders’ Licenses, PALM BEACH DAILY BUS. REV., Oct. 11,
2004, at 7.
132. Id. at 7–8.
133. Id. at 8.
134. Siobhan Morrissey, Med-Mal War Hits the Ballot, 30 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 1, 2 (2004).
135. Ellman, supra note 131, at 8.
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over retroactive application: Would doctors who already had two malpractice
judgments against them have to settle future cases out of fear of losing their
licenses?136
To resolve some of these issues, the Florida Attorney General requested an
advisory opinion from the Florida Supreme Court regarding the Amendment’s
constitutionality under Florida law.137 The court determined (1) whether the
Amendment satisfied the single-subject requirement under Florida’s
constitution;138 and (2) whether the ballot title and summary satisfied the
requirements imposed by Florida law.139 The Florida Medical Association
argued the Amendment violated the single-subject requirement because it
would substantially alter or perform “the functions of multiple aspects of
government.”140 The court rejected this argument and found that the
Amendment did not affect the legislative or judicial branch in “precipitous” or
“cataclysmic” ways that would justify striking the proposal.141 The court also
rejected that the Amendment would require license revocation on the basis of a
preponderance standard instead of the clear and convincing evidence standard
applied by the state medical board, which would force the judiciary to either
overrule established law or change the standard of proof in malpractice
cases.142 The court stated that this speculation was premature, despite potential
for the Amendment’s “broad ramifications.”143 Next, the Florida Medical
Association argued the Amendment’s language violated Florida law because it
was misleading and ambiguous in lacking clear definitions for terms like
“medical malpractice” and “found to have committed.”144 The court also
rejected these arguments and held that Florida law did not require “‘an

136. Id.
137. In re Advisory Opinion to Att’y Gen. re Pub. Prot. from Repeated Malpractice, 880 So.
2d 667, 668 (Fla. 2004).
138. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (“The power to propose the revision or amendment of any
portion or portions of this constitution by initiative is reserved to the people, provided that any
such revision or amendment . . . shall embrace but one subject and matter directly connected
therewith.”)
139. In re Advisory Opinion to Att’y Gen. re Pub. Prot. from Repeated Malpractice, 880
So.2d at 669–73. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.161 (2007) (“Whenever a constitutional
amendment or other public measure is submitted to the vote of the people, the substance of such
amendment or other public measure shall be printed in clear and unambiguous language.”).
140. In re Advisory Opinion to Att’y Gen. re Pub. Prot. from Repeated Malpractice, 880
So.2d at 669.
141. Id. at 670 (citing In re Advisory Opinion to Att’y Gen. re Requirement for Adequate
Pub. Educ. Funding, 703 So.2d 446, 450 (Fla. 1997)).
142. Id. at 670–71.
143. Id. at 671 (quoting In re Advisory Opinion to Att’y Gen.—English—The Official
Language of Florida, 520 So.2d 11, 13 (Fla. 1988)).
144. Id. at 671–73.
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exhaustive explanation of the interpretation and future possible effects of the
amendment’ . . . in the ballot title and summary.”145
Despite the controversy, the Florida Supreme Court approved the language
of the proposed amendment, and the ballot was put to a vote in the November
election.146 On November 2, 2004, the Amendment passed by a substantial
margin.147
B.

Clarifications to Amendment 8 Integrate a Clear and Convincing
Evidence Standard

On November 4, 2004, physicians were already discussing challenges to
the Amendment, which was then part of the Florida constitution.148 Attorneys
for physicians argued that the Amendment was unconstitutional “because it
pressure[d] doctors to surrender their due process guarantee to trial by jury” by
not counting pre-trial settlements toward a doctor’s three strikes.149 Another
concern arose from the Amendment’s application to out-of-state judgments
where standards of proof may differ.150 As a result of several concerns over
the implementation of the Amendment, the Florida Hospital Association
convinced the circuit court to stay the enforcement of the Amendment for a
year in order to allow legislators to draft enabling legislation.151
In late April 2005, the State House passed two bills explaining how the
Amendment would be put into effect. First, the legislation provided that only
incidents occurring on or after November 2, 2004, would count toward a
physician’s three strikes.152 Similarly, multiple findings of malpractice arising
from the same incident and incidents involving multiple claimants would count
only as a single strike.153 For the purposes of the Amendment, strikes would
not include settlements—only final judgments in a court of law, final
administrative agency decisions or decisions of binding arbitration would

145. Id. at 673 (citing Advisory Opinion to Att’y Gen. re Amendment to Bar Gov’t from
Treating People Differently Based on Race in Pub. Educ., 778 So.2d 888, 899 (Fla. 2000)).
146. Id. at 670.
147. Steve Ellman, Lawyers’ Challenges Already in the Works, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV.,
Nov. 4, 2004, at 1–2 (stating that Amendment 8 passed with the support of more than 70% of
Florida voters).
148. Id. at 2.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Steve Ellman, Ignoring the Voters: Interest Groups Battle in Court to Block
Constitutional Amendments Approved by Floridians Last Month, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Dec.
20, 2004, at 10.
152. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.50(1)(h) (2007).
153. § 456.50(1)(d).
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count.154 One clarification, however, would help to alleviate physician
concerns over a “surge of malpractice claims.”155
In its enabling legislation, Florida lawmakers decided to safeguard the
procedural due process rights of physicians by applying a strict evidentiary
standard to malpractice claims against them. According to current Florida law,
for the purposes of implementing the Three Strikes Rule, the state medical
board “shall not license or continue to license a medical doctor found to have
committed repeated malpractice, the finding of which was based upon clear
and convincing evidence.”156 Under this addition, if the state medical board
determines that a malpractice action was decided under “a standard less
stringent than clear and convincing evidence, the board shall review the record
of the case and determine whether the finding would be supported under a
standard of clear and convincing evidence.”157 The evidentiary standard
provides the board with the ability to block a licensure revocation if the board
thinks the evidence would be insufficient under the higher standard. In passing
this legislation, Florida created a regime that protected the public while
simultaneously cushioning the due process rights of physicians.
V. ANALYSIS: INTEGRATING POLICY CONCERNS
The policy concerns behind the evidentiary standards debate are similar to
those in many constitutional debates: protection of the individual versus the
protection of the public.158 Arguably, current schemes that grant state medical
boards sole discretion in licensure revocations have not effectively reduced the
number of incompetent doctors.159 This raises serious concerns regarding the
adequacy of public protection by failing to address the interests of medical
malpractice victims. Alternatively, physicians under a preponderance standard
regime feel that their due process rights are not properly protected.160 The
Florida Three Strikes Rule provides an alternative scheme that balances the
competing concerns of the Mathews three-prong test. This regime potentially
removes more faulty physicians who pose a threat to the public, while the
incorporation of a clear and convincing evidence standard ensures that the due
process rights of physicians are protected. This will likely lead to not only a

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

§ 456.50(1)(c).
Hawkins, supra note 18, at 10.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.50(2) (2007) (emphasis added).
Id.
See supra Part III.
See PUB. CITIZEN’S CONG. WATCH, supra note 12, at 13–16.
See supra Part III.B.
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greater number of license revocations, but also a greater number of correct
license revocations.161
A.

The Three Strikes Rule Extends Greater Protection to the Public than
Current State Medical Board Regimes

One of the reasons the Amendment was enacted was to provide a
mechanism for disciplining doctors with a history of bad medical judgment.162
Studies show that multiple malpractice judgments are strong indications of
doctors who consistently fall below proper standards of care.163 A scheme that
automatically revokes a physician’s license deprives the board of its deferential
discretion in situations where peer review has protected incompetent
physicians.
Although physicians are arguably some of the most trained and careful
professionals in American society, the rate of error still remains high.164 A
1990 Harvard study of physicians determined that from a group of 7,743
medical records, 280 revealed adverse events that occurred as a result of
negligence.165 Negligence was associated with fifty-one percent of all deaths
from medical injury.166 In a more recent study, medical error was found to be
the “fifth-leading cause of deaths in the United States,” causing as many as
98,000 deaths every year.167 Unfortunately, when physicians deviate from the
proper standard of care, the potential effects may result in serious harm to their
patients. Physicians are among the few professionals who have a direct impact
on nearly every individual in society. As a result, the government creates vast

161. For the purposes of this article, the author uses the term “correct license revocations” to
mean license revocations that are supported by sufficient evidence in accordance with proper due
process procedures.
162. Ellman, supra note 131, at 7.
163. See generally PUB. CITIZEN’S CONG. WATCH, supra note 12, at 7–9.
164. Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1851–52 (1994). Medical error is
substantially attributed to mindset of the medical profession and its expectation of physicians to
be infallible. Id. at 1851. This creates situation where reporting remains low and little is done to
improve the institutional shortcomings that are largely responsible for medical errors. Id. The
aviation industry, in contrast, has effectively improved its record for adverse incidents by (1)
designing a system under the assumption that errors will occur, thereby allowing the system to
buffer against the effects of the incident; (2) standardizing procedures; (3) rigidly enforcing the
training, examination and certification processes; and (4) creating a system where pilots are not
penalized for reporting near misses for adverse incidents. Id. at 1855.
165. HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK 6–9 (1990).
In the context of the article, “adverse event” is defined as “the incidence of injuries resulting from
medical interventions.” Id. at 1.
166. Id. at 4.
167. Medical Error is the Fifth-Leading Cause of Death in the U.S., MEDICAL NEWS TODAY,
June 23, 2007, available at http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/75042.php.
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regulatory schemes, primarily through the police power given to the states, to
ensure that the public health is properly protected against those who are illqualified to practice medicine.168 Unfortunately, error is still a common
occurrence within the medical community.
A report by the Public Citizen indicates that while malpractice payments
remain high, the number of physicians who have malpractice judgments
against them remains low.169 Since 1990, only eighteen percent of doctors
have paid out a medical malpractice award.170 This figure reveals that the
majority of medical malpractice is committed by a small percentage of
doctors.171 Unfortunately, peer review often fails to protect the public from
this small faction of repeat offenders. Of the doctors who have made ten or
more malpractice payments since 1990, only thirty-three percent had action
taken against them by the state medical board.172 This percentage includes any
kind of disciplinary action, not just licensure revocations. One physician “had
at least thirty-one malpractice payments between 1993 and 2005,”—three
payments alone because the doctor retained a foreign object in a patient’s body
after surgery.173 Another surgeon paid out malpractice payments at least
eighteen times; twelve of those payments resulted from “improper performance
of surgery.”174 These statistics indicate that the problem of protecting the
public does not stem from evidentiary standards, but rather the failure to
prosecute incompetent doctors despite glaring red flags that the doctor is
consistently negligent in his practice of medicine.
William P. Gunnar explains several reasons why state licensing boards are
inefficient monitors of physician misbehavior and incompetence.175 First, the
decision of a state medical licensing board to suspend or revoke a license is
subject to judicial review, which decreases the finality of decisions.176 Second,
due to limited budgets and insufficiency of staff, boards have trouble
defending lawsuits when physicians contest a board’s decision in court.177
Added costs are associated with investigations and hearings conducted by the

168. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (providing the constitutional
foundation for the states’ ability to enact public health laws for the protection of the public).
169. PUB. CITIZEN’S CONG. WATCH, supra note 12, at 12.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 14.
173. Id.
174. PUB. CITIZEN’S CONG. WATCH, supra note 12, at 14.
175. William P. Gunnar, The Scope of a Physician’s Medical Practice: Is the Public
Adequately Protected by State Medical Licensure, Peer Review, and the National Practitioner
Data Bank?, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 329, 340 (2005).
176. Id. at 340–41.
177. Id. at 341.
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board itself.178 Third, physicians may be lenient when judging a peer.179
Fourth, there may be lengthy processing delays when a board attempts to
Fifth, due process requires more than
discipline the physician.180
181
circumstantial evidence.
Finally, courts generally limit their support of
disciplinary actions by state boards only in regard to actions involving
“regulated narcotics, abortions, and physician-assisted suicide.”182 The Florida
statute theoretically eradicates many of these problems faced by state medical
boards that use either a preponderance or clear and convincing evidence
standard. This is largely because the Three Strikes Rule provides an automatic
mechanism for disciplining physicians as opposed to relying on the discretion
of the board to prosecute claims.
Most times, disciplinary committees depend on complaints from patients
or patients’ families to begin an investigation.183 Several boards can conduct
an investigation without a formal public complaint, but they may lack the
budget to provide information and tracking systems necessary to spot
problematic physicians.184 While repeated malpractice payments are clear
indications of incompetent physicians, the board may lack the fiscal capability
or the integrity to conduct an investigation, evaluate the evidence, conduct a
hearing and impose sanctions.185 For instance, the median state medical board
spends forty-nine percent of its budget on investigative functions alone.186
Implementing a structure that automatically revokes a physician’s license
would greatly reduce the fiscal restraints on boards by removing several of the
costly steps in physician discipline. The investigative costs are substantially
diminished because the private parties in past litigation have already assumed
the burden by creating a record in the course of the dispute. The records from
the formal adjudications create a preserved evidentiary record the board may
use in determining whether the license revocation is appropriate.187 Although
the Florida legislature determined that requests for administrative hearings and
178. See BOVBJERG & ALIAGA, supra note 14, at 15 (“In practice, how much financial
support Medical Boards receive depends both upon the level of licensure and other fees assessed
(including whether the Board retains any fines or other monies collected) as well as how much of
fees the legislature appropriates.”).
179. Gunnar, supra note 175, at 341.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. BOVBJERG & ALIAGA, supra note 14, at vi.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. FLA. STAT. § 456.50(2) (2007) (stating “[t]he board may require licensees and applicants
for licensure to provide a copy of the record of the trial of any medical malpractice judgment,
which may be required to be in an electronic format, involving an incident that occurred on or
after November 2, 2004”).
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binding arbitration hearings would increase, the cost of these proceedings
would be minimal compared to the state board’s overall budget.188
The public is also protected because the amendment removes the potential
leniency of peer review. Scholars have criticized medical board for their high
composition of other physicians; this may result in a veil of silence and a
reluctance to revoke licensure due to the bonds of sharing a difficult
profession.189 The Three Strikes Rule substantially diminishes a board’s
ability to protect their own in situations where a clearly incompetent doctor
should not be permitted to retain a license. Once a doctor has three
malpractice judgments against him or her, the board cannot turn a blind eye
and shield the doctor from the consequences of his or her actions without
violating the law itself.190 Under the Three Strikes Rule, the board no longer
examines the merits of the action, but may only evaluate whether the evidence
is sufficient in all three cases to support revocation under the statute.191
Although little investigation has been conducted since the Amendment’s
passage, the Amendment should logically result in a greater number of
disciplinary actions before the board. In this way, a large part of the problem
created by peer review boards is rectified because the board may no longer
pick and choose all actions that come before it for review. The Amendment
taps into a pool of doctors who, by virtue of their malpractice claims, should
arguably be examined for their competency, and the law enables boards to
examine these doctors without the costs of investigations or hearings.
B.

Weighing the Private Interest of Physicians

It may be obvious that the public interest is better protected by the Three
Strikes Rule in that it diminishes the discretion of medical boards in revoking
physician licenses. After all, the Amendment itself was passed by a citizens’
initiative.192 The arguments presented by the physicians in Hsu and Nguyen,
however, should not be taken lightly. Arguably, physicians invest more time
and money into pursuing their careers than almost any other professionals in
America.

188. OFFICE OF ECON. & DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH, THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE,
INITIATIVE FINANCIAL INFORMATION STATEMENT: PUBLIC PROTECTION FROM REPEATED
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (2004), available at http://edr.state.fl.us/conferences/constitutional
impact/2004%20Ballot/a4fis_complete.pdf (“The direct financial impact on state or local
governments resulting from the proposed initiative would be minimal. There will likely be
additional costs to the state of less than $1 million per year, but these costs will be offset by
licensure fees.”).
189. Gunnar, supra note 175, at 346.
190. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.50(2) (2007).
191. Id.
192. See supra Part IV.A.
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As of October 2001, the average medical student incurred $99,089 of debt
from attending medical school alone.193 In addition, physicians invest
countless hours in pursuit of a medical degree and devote over eighty hours per
week to work during their residencies and practice.194 The high price of
malpractice insurance has caused several doctors to leave the profession in
high-risk areas like obstetrics.195
Unlike civil actions, which involve the payment of money to the injured
party, licensure revocation involves the deprivation of a doctor’s ability to
pursue his livelihood. The monetary penalty is significant for doctors,
especially compared to other professions.196 Similar to a criminal conviction,
professional discipline also “invariably blights a professional’s reputation and
can destroy one’s career and life.”197 Disciplinary actions tend to share similar
goals with penal convictions: deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation of
liberty or behavior, or retribution.198 As such, it is important to be mindful of
the interests held in a life’s work, and deprivation of a career can be far more
devastating than the simple payment of money.
The Nguyen court emphasizes the difference between payment of a civil
money damage and the revocation of a medical license.199 In its opinion, the
Nguyen court explained several situations that rise above the level of a civil
money judgment, which include “quasi-criminal wrongdoings by the
defendant” and proceedings that incur the risk of having one’s “reputation
tarnished erroneously.”200 For these reasons, the public interest should not be
weighed at the complete expense of the physician’s interest. In a three strikes
193. Suri Santana, Paying the Price to Become a Doctor: The Impact of Medical School Debt,
AAMC, Jan. 2002, available at http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/jan02/medschool
debt.htm.
194. PUB. CITIZEN’S CONG. WATCH, supra note 12, at 18 (“American physicians are famous
for their extensive work hours.”). The authors of the study suggested limiting physicians to only
eighty hours of work per week to reduce the risk of fatigue-induced errors, which implies that
most physicians work far beyond the recommended average in consecutive work shifts. Id.
195. High Cost of Malpractice Insurance Threatens Supply of OB/GYNs, Especially in Some
Urban Areas, June 1, 2005, http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2005-06/uomh-hco053
105.php.
196. See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: OCCUPATIONAL
WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES, June 2006 (2007), available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ocs/sp/
ncbl0910.pdf. Physician salaries far exceed the salary of the average American worker. The
average American earns $41,231 per year, whereas physicians and surgeons earn an average of
$127,020 per year and dentists earn an average of $130,057 per year. Id. at 4, 10. One of the
only other professionals to come close to physicians’ salaries were attorneys, who make an
average of $116,375 per year. Id. at 7
197. Spece & Marchalonis, supra note 6, at 114.
198. Id.
199. Nguyen v. State, Dept. of Med. Quality Assurance Comm’n, 29 P.3d 689, 693 (Wash.
2001) (en banc).
200. Id.
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regime, however, the desirability of public protection has a tendency to stifle
the individual rights of citizens without providing proper safeguards. This is
why a clear and convincing evidence standard is an essential feature to the
fairness and constitutionality of the Three Strikes Rule.
C. The Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard Applied in the Three Strikes
Rule Alleviates the Risk of Wrongful Deprivation
Although the Three Strikes Rule creates a blanket of public protection not
originally afforded to victims of malpractice, it is highly likely that
enforcement under a preponderance standard would be a clear violation of due
process for several reasons.
Under the Mathews test, an administrative proceeding violates due process
if it creates a substantial risk that an individual will be wrongfully deprived of
a private interest.201 Some have argued that under the traditional regime, a
state board that conducts a formal hearing using a preponderance standard
instead of a clear and convincing evidence standard already violates
constitutional due process requirements.202 As previously stated, the
investigators for state medical boards are often members of the medical
profession itself and take part in the investigatory, prosecutorial and
administrative functions of the disciplinary process.203 This “blending of
functions” does not in itself violate procedural due process; however, some
courts have observed that this scenario increases the risk that a physician’s
rights will be erroneously violated under a preponderance standard.204
Similarly, advocates for the clear and convincing evidence standard argue that
boards that are pressured by the government and the media to be harder on
physicians are more likely to erroneously deprive them of their licenses under
the preponderance standard.205
Advocates of a preponderance standard argue that a lower standard would
result in more licensure revocations, and as a result, the public interest would
be greater protected against incompetent physicians.206 While there is very
little evidence with regard to the disciplinary outcomes of using either
standard, it is probable that in egregious instances of malpractice, a doctor who
is disciplined under a preponderance standard would also be disciplined under
a clear and convincing evidence standard. For example, Wyoming uses a clear
and convincing evidentiary standard in licensure proceedings and was ranked

201. See supra Part III.A.
202. See, e.g., Nguyen, 29 P.3d at 689; Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931 (Wyo. 2000).
203. Spece & Marchalonis, supra note 6, at 125–26.
204. Id. (quoting Robinson v. State ex. rel. Okla. State Bd. of Med. Licensure and
Supervision, 916 P.2d 1390, 1393 (Okla. 1996)).
205. Id. at 124.
206. See generally Widmer, supra note 11.
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first in the country in 2002 for the percentage of serious disciplinary actions
taken against doctors.207 North Dakota, which uses a preponderance standard,
was ranked second that year, showing that evidentiary standards might have
little influence on whether or not an incompetent doctor will be disciplined.208
Theoretically, a small contingent of doctors would escape liability under a
clear and convincing evidence standard. In this situation, however, Roy G.
Spece argues that advocates of a preponderance standard “reflect a willingness
to destroy individual physicians’ lives, careers, and reputations even when
there is a forty-nine percent chance that the charges are false,” and it is far
more favorable to err on the side of caution to protect the private interests of
the physician.209
The U.S. Supreme Court has refused to decide whether a preponderance
standard in a formal medical board hearing constitutes a violation of due
process.210 While there are strong arguments indicating that erroneous
deprivation of a physician’s rights is increased by use of a preponderance
standard, this risk would increase exponentially under a three strikes regime.
According to current Florida law, civil malpractice actions use a
preponderance of the evidence standard, which is commonly used in most
states.211 If a state were to use that same preponderance standard under a three
strikes regime, it would eliminate any need for review of the doctor’s record
prior to revoking his license because the evidentiary standards for both
proceedings would be identical. Under the Mathews test, this situation would
not only increase the likelihood that a review proceeding would cause
erroneous deprivation, but it also could potentially eliminate the need for any
review proceeding at all. Essentially, if a doctor committed three instances of
malpractice, all of the proceedings would necessarily meet a preponderance of
the evidence standard under Florida malpractice law, collapsing the review
process for state medical boards. Therefore, if a state’s Three Strikes Rule
used a preponderance standard, theoretically, no added safeguard or review
procedure would be necessary to revoke the physician’s license.
This situation is problematic for two reasons. First, the Florida Three
Strikes Rule is a mechanism that not only deprives medical boards of
discretion in whether to conduct an investigation, but also of some of the

207. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 129.
208. Id.
209. Spece & Marchalonis, supra note 6, at 129.
210. Wash. State Med. Quality Assur. Com’n v. Nguyen, 29 P.3d 689, cert. denied, 535 U.S.
904 (2002).
211. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.102(1) (2007) (stating that a claimant in a medical malpractice
action “shall have the burden of proving by the greater weight of evidence that the alleged actions
of the health care provider represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care for
that health care provider”).
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decisionmaking power with regard to revocation.212 This is one reason the
Three Strikes Rule was so unpopular with physicians to begin with—it
deprives doctors of a hearing on the merits when they were previously afforded
one under traditional licensure laws.213 By depriving doctors of any review
procedure whatsoever, it further deprives the board of any discretion to prevent
license revocation where it is unjust or inappropriate. Second, the private
interests at stake in civil trials are completely different than those at stake in
licensure proceedings. In a civil trial, the dispute occurs between two private
parties and the consequences are usually monetary. Liability in a malpractice
suit generally entails a payment of damages. Unlike a private suit, doctors
must defend their ability to practice their chosen careers in revocation
proceedings. If a doctor has his license taken away, it deprives him not only of
personal funds, but also of the ability to practice medicine and make a
livelihood altogether. Therefore, under the Mathews framework, the law must
leave some procedural safeguards to ensure that a physician is not unfairly
deprived of his livelihood.
Under the current Florida Three Strikes Rule, a clear and convincing
evidence standard alleviates the due process concerns discussed in Nguyen and
other cases while still furthering the public interest.214 According to the
Florida constitution, a doctor’s license is not automatically revoked unless he
committed three instances of malpractice based on clear and convincing
evidence.215 Since the evidentiary standard for malpractice actions in Florida
is a preponderance standard, the state medical board must review the doctor’s
record to see if the malpractice findings would have been supported by clear
and convincing evidence.216 By enforcing a clear and convincing evidence
standard, the statute creates a review procedure that is more mindful of due
process than a statute utilizing a preponderance standard. The Amendment
requires the state medical board to reexamine the doctor’s record to assess
whether his behavior is worthy of revocation, thus providing a procedure that
protects the physician’s individual interests.217
While the clear and convincing evidentiary standard is ideal for several
reasons, it could pose a potential problem in practice—the possibility of
essentially retrying cases. The actual procedures under the law have yet to be
determined; however, it appears the board would not have to retry each case in
the sense of a formal hearing. The law states that if a potential strike, or

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
(2005).
217.

See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
See Nguyen, 29 P.3d at 689.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.50(2) (2007).
Florida Lawmakers Clarify Amendments, 22 MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY 11
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.50(2) (2007).
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malpractice case, was determined based on a standard lower than clear and
convincing evidence, “the board shall review the record of the case and
determine whether the finding would be supported under a standard of clear
and convincing evidence.”218 The procedures for a normal revocation hearing
would then apply, which include, but are not limited to: (1) an investigation;
(2) a hearing based on the finding of probable cause; (3) a formal hearing
before an administrative law judge if there are any “disputed issues of material
fact,” not including those determinations regarding reasonable standard of care
or laws and regulation of the profession; and (4) standing to seek judicial
review of any final order of the board.219 It appears that the first two
requirements would not be necessary as long as a court deemed the malpractice
case records sufficient for the investigation and probable cause requirements.
It may be more difficult to determine whether the board’s determinations based
on clear and convincing evidence would create “disputed issues of material
fact” sufficient to justify an administrative hearing. This situation would
clearly take some of the mechanization and efficiency out of a Three Strikes
Rule; however, the doctor would still be precluded from disputing
determinations of the board based on the standard of care issue in an
administrative hearing.220 Thus, even assuming the professional would be
allowed to seek judicial review of the board’s determination, a three strikes
regime should still remove some of the costly and time-consuming steps of a
current system—even with a clear and convincing evidence standard.
A clear and convincing evidence standard certainly loosens the firm grip of
a Three Strikes Rule on repeat medical malpractice offenders. This loosening
potentially circumvents some of the intent of the original law. However, it still
significantly addresses the concerns behind the citizens’ initiative. For
instance, some critics might argue that by placing a discretionary mechanism
on the automatic revocation scheme, the board could use the clear and
convincing evidence provision to avoid revocation and thus evade the
Amendment’s purpose.221 Although this is a possibility, the current scheme
still firmly focuses on one of the bigger problems with a traditional licensing
board scenario—insufficient prosecution. According to a government study of
six state medical boards, only one and a half percent of all complaints
regarding physician discipline make it to the formal hearing stage as a result of
budgetary restraints, insufficient evidence or other competing concerns.222 The
results are not much better regarding discipline of repeat offenders. According

218. Id.
219. Id. According to the Three Strikes Rule, the procedures under Florida’s disciplinary
proceedings statute would apply. See § 456.073 (2007).
220. Id.
221. See § 456.50(2) (2007).
222. BOVBJERG & ALIAGA, supra note 14, at 24.
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to the Public Citizen, “only [thirty-three] percent of doctors who made 10 or
more malpractice payments were disciplined by their state board.”223
Arguably, these are the problems the citizens’ initiative sought to address, and
under the current scheme, some cases that would not have originally come
before the review board must now be examined. The board is no longer given
the choice of ignoring a doctor who has committed ten instances of
malpractice—the doctor must undergo examination.224 The only way the
doctor or the board may avoid license revocation is if the evidence in the case
does not meet a clear and convincing standard.225
Further, the Three Strikes Rule does not prevent the board from
prosecuting complaints under the traditional scheme and instituting other
penalties as it normally would.226 When the Florida Three Strikes Rule was
added to the state constitution and later modified to include the clear and
convincing evidence standard, it did not remove the existing medical board
procedures for physician discipline.227 Instead, the Amendment merely added
an additional safeguard to ensure that repeat offenders of malpractice did not
slip through the cracks of licensure discipline. Nothing prevents the board
under the current scheme from investigating, prosecuting and disciplining
physicians as a result of a complaint, even for one instance of medical
malpractice.228 The Three Strikes Rule does not lessen the obligations of the
board to revoke the licenses of incompetent physicians. Rather, the clear and
convincing evidence standard simply requires the board to discipline with a
higher degree of certainty in a situation where a legal mechanism automatically
takes the doctor’s license without a right to a formal hearing.
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the current medical malpractice dilemma, the need for fair and
uniform standards is more important than ever. On the one hand, patients who
have suffered at the hands of incompetent doctors deserve not only
compensation, but also protection and peace of mind that harmful physicians
are no longer permitted to practice. On the other hand, physicians who invest
time, money and hard work into their professional practice deserve a fair and
meaningful procedure that provides protection for their constitutional rights.
Uniform standards provide predictability for litigants and stability in the law.
Unfortunately, when state courts are faced with determining the correct

223. PUB. CITIZEN’S CONG. WATCH, supra note 12, at 13.
224. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.50(2) (2007).
225. Id.
226. § 456.073 (2007).
227. See § 456.50(2) (2007).
228. § 456.073 (2007) (assuming the Board finds probable cause under the statute to conduct
a hearing).
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evidentiary standard for state medical boards, the attempt to resolve competing
interests creates dissonance in the law and makes fairness impossible under
current regimes. Courts that balance these competing interests are forced to tip
the scale in one direction or the other, creating a situation where one side must
strike out.
A three strikes regime creates a reliable, uniform and cost-effective method
for taking on repeat medical malpractice offenders. By automatically
removing incompetent physicians from the public, the scheme alleviates the
costs of investigation and the potential leniency of state medical boards, thus
protecting the public interest. By widening the playing field, however, the
scheme creates the likelihood that doctors will be erroneously deprived of their
right to practice medicine. This is why a clear and convincing evidentiary
standard is necessary in the context of a three strikes amendment. Ideally, the
scheme will weed out bad doctors while ensuring fairness of procedure, which
will create a better balance between two irreconcilable interests. By tightening
the “strike zone” of physician licensure revocations with a clear and
convincing evidentiary standard, doctors can get a fair chance at the plate
before striking out, and innocent patients can play a game they finally have a
chance to win.
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